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SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM
OF PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS FOR PENDENT CLAIMS
James C. Krause*
In 1953, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Wilko v. Swan and held that the Securities Act of 1933
rendered unenforceable agreements to arbitrate federal securities
law claims arising out of disputes between investors and broker-
dealers. Since that date, courts have been faced with complex ques-
tions when investors have sued broker-dealers for both non-
arbitrable federal securities claims and arbitrable state lawc claims.
Mr. Krause examines some of the problems presented by the cur-
rent state of the law and proposes that the superior remedy of
arbitration, if guaranteed to be fair, uniform, inexpensive, and ef-
ficient by statute or regulation, should be available to resolve all
securities disputes. Mr. Krause further proposes that when such
arbitration procedures are formulated, Wilko v. Swan should be
overruled.
While arbitration as a mode of private dispute resolution was once consid-
ered with suspicion and distrust, I it is now lauded as a valuable and proper
alternative to litigation. 2 With respect to arbitration of securities controver-
* Associate Sullivan, Jones & Archer, San Diego, California. Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of San Diego School of Law. B.A., Haverford College; J.D., University of San Diego
School of Law; member, California Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of
Louis A. Korahais, Esq., regarding the PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS portion of this article. Mr.
Korahais is currently an Assistant Vice-President, Compliance Officer, at the Bank of America,
and from 1968-1978 he was the Director of Arbitration at the National Association of Securities
Dealers.
1. As Congress noted in considering the Federal Arbitration Act:
The need for this law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some cen-
turies ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction,
they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the
courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy was adopted by
the American courts.
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). See, e.g., W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co.,
190 Cal. 665, 667, 214 P. 38, 39 (1923) (agreement to arbitrate unenforceable as constituting an
attempt to oust the court of jurisdiction); Cocalis v. Nazilides, 308 Il1. 152, 159-60, 139 N.E. 95,
98-99 (1923) (predispute agreement void as it deprives parties of right to resort to the courts as
provided in the constitution); Gauche v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 125 La. 530, 534-35, 51 S.
578, 579 (1910) (arbitration agreement not enforced because of court's fear of administrative
difficulties in so doing); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (predispute agreement void
as tending to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts). See generally Comment, Arbitration-A
Viable Alternative?, 1974-75 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53.
2. See, e.g.,Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 706-08, 552 P.22d 1178.
1182-83, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 886-87 (1976); Player v. George M. Brewster & Son, Inc., 18 Cal.
App. 3d 526, 534, 96 Cal. Rptr. 149, 154 (1971); Egell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator
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sies, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has stated that the best
interests of both investors and the securities industry demand a fully effec-
tive, yet inexpensive, system for dispute resolution. 3 In fact, arbitration of
investor-broker 4 disputes in securities matters is gaining the increasing at-
tention of the legal community. 5
Although under the present law, an investor may agree to submit an exist-
ing controversy with a broker-dealer to arbitration, 6 a predispute arbitration
provision 7 is not enforceable against an investor for claims arising under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 8 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act),9 or the regulations promulgated pursuant to these stat-
utes. 10 This bar to the compelled arbitration of securities claims rests upon
provisions of the federal securities acts designed to protect investors from
waiving the valuable right to seek damages in the federal courts' 1 fbr se-
curities law violations.
The prohibition of predispute arbitration agreements does not, however,
extend to state claims arising from securities transactions but not based upon
federal securities law. 12 Instead, the arbitrability of claims arising under
state statutory or common law is determined solely by reference to either
Co., 76 Colo. 409, 411-12, 232 P. 680, 681 (1925); S.M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff, 9 N.Y.2d 356,
362, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377, 174 N.E.2d 478, 480 (1961). Forty states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government have enacted statutes providing for the enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements. See A. WIDiss, ARBIrRATION 343-44 (1979) (listing these states with
citations to statutes). Indeed, Chief Justice Burger has stated that "[t]here are a great many
problems that should not come to judges at all, and can be disposed of in other ways, better
ways. . . .[O]ne basic way ... is the use of private arbitration." FORBES, July 1, 1971, at 21.
3. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12974, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,807, at 87,105.
4. An investor-broker relationship exists between a private person and a "broker-dealer"
registered with a national securities exchange or with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) pursuant to § 15(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C.
9 78o(a)(1) (1976).
5. See, e.g., Neville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in Investor-Broker Agree-
ioents, 34 ARB. J. 5 (1979); Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L.
REv. 120 (1977); Note, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Fraud Actions Under the
Securities Act, 62 YALE L.J. 985 (1953).
6. Tullis v. Kohlmeyer Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1977); Coenen v. R.W. Presspich
& Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972); Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d
367, 368 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971); Moron v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968).
7. This Article is concerned solely with predispute arbitration agreements-agreements to
submit future disputes to persons outside the judicial process for resolution. Submission
agreements-agreements to submit existing controversies to arbitration-are beyond the scope
of this Article.
8. 15 U.S.C. 9 77a-77aa (1976). See notes 46-75 and accompanying text infra.
9. 15 U.S.C. 99 78a-78kk (1976). See notes 61-75 and accompanying text infra.
10. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 46-58 infra.
12. See DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (state law claims arising
from securities transaction arbitrable under arbitration clause in binding agreement pursuant to
Federal Arbitration Act); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(common law securities claims arbitrable under Federal Arbitration Act).
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state arbitration law 13 or the Federal Arbitration Act. 14 Because the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act applies to claims arising from transactions involving in-
terstate commerce,15 and because securities dealings usually involve such
transactions, 16 state securities claims are normally arbitrable. Yet, when ar-
bitrable state securities claims are joined with nonarbitrable Securities Act or
Exchange Act claims, the question arises whether these pendent state claims
are still subject to arbitration.
Although the courts have reached no consensus, 17 it is important, for sev-
eral reasons, to determine whether these pendent state law claims remain
arbitrable. If they are arbitrable, all questions regarding punitive damages
will be removed from the federal action because punitive damages are re-
coverable only under state law. 18 In addition, because in some jurisdictions
13. See cases cited in note 2 supra. Of the 40 states that have enacted statutes providing for
the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements, 19 have enacted the Uniform Arbitration
Act. See A. WIDIss, ARBITRATION 343-44 (1979). Most of the other 21 states have enacted laws
substantially similar to the Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. at 225. The seminal provision of the Act
provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provi-
sion in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising
between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This act also applies to
arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respec-
tive representatives [unless otherwise provided in the agreement].
Uniform Arbitration Act § 1, 7 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 4 (1978).
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). See text accompanying notes 22-25 infra.
15. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text infra.
16. For example, if an investor-broker transaction satisfied any of the criteria listed in sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976), so as to be within the jurisdiction of
that Act, see note 48 infra, the transaction (contract) would also be subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act.
17. Compare the discussion of Machiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21
(E.D. Cal. 1974), and DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla. 1976), in text accompanying
notes 102-120 infra, wvith the discussion of Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), and Sibley v. Tandy Co., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977),
in text accompanying notes 132-137 infra.
18. The damages sections of the Securities Act, §§ 11(e), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771(2)
(1976), do not provide for the recovery of punitive damages. See Avens Trust v. Clarke, 415
F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D.
I11. 1970), appeal dismissed, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972). In addition, punitive damages are not
allowed under the implied cause of action found in section 17 (a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 q(a) (1976). See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-86 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
Punitive damages are also not recoverable under the Exchange Act by virtue of § 28(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), which provides that no one shall recover "a total amount in excess of
his actual damages." See Straub v. Vaismon & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3d Cir. 1976) (no puni-
tive damages under rule 10b-5); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S, Co., 535 F.2d 761, 781 (3d
Cir. 1976) (no punitive damages under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968) (damages limited to actual damages under rule 10b-5), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
Punitive damages are, however, generally allowed under state law for claims involving se-
curities violations. See, e.g., Flaks v, Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974); Globus v. Law
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a principal's liability for the acts of his or her agent is greater under state law
than under the federal securities laws, 19 it is important in measuring a
broker-dealer's liability to determine whether the pendent claims will be
tried jointly with the federal securities claims or will be severed for arbitra-
Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 192 (S.D.N.Y.), aff d in part and rev'd in part, 418
F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
19. Under state law, the liability of a principal for the acts of his or her agent is measured
by the common law theory of respondeat superior. See United States v. Fox Lake State Bank,
240 F. Supp. 720, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1965), modified, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1966); Tollett v.
Montgomery Real Estate & hIs. Co., 238 Ala. 617, 621, 193 So. 127, 129 (1940); Lipscomb v.
Coppage, 44 I11. App. 2d 430, 43 0 p, 197 N.E. 2d 48, 56 (1964). Under respondeat superior, an
employer is liable for the tortious acts of an employee done in the course and scope of employ-
ment or within the employee's authority or apparent authority, regardless of the employer's
intent, knowledge, negligence, or good faith. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349,
356 (1929); Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Govro, 407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969); SEC v.
Lure's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1062-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Under federal securities law, the liability of a principal is measured by the "controlling per-
son" standard. The Securities Act provides that a person is liable to the same extent as is a
person he or she "controls," "unless the controlling person has no knowledge of, or reasonable
ground to believe in, the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist." Securities Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976). Under the Exchange Act
a person is liable to the same extent as a person he or she "controls," "unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action." Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). In practice,
"good faith" can be demonstrated by a showing that the broker-dealer adequately supervised
the employee in conformance with guidelines of the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
438 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
The essential difference between the controlling person theory and respondeat superior is
that while respondeat superior imposes, in effect, absolute liability upon a broker-dealer for the
acts of an employee, the controlling person theory of vicarious liability imposes liability only if
the broker-dealer has been somewhat at fault. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299
(2d Cir. 1973) (culpable participation by broker-dealer required before liability imposed tinder
§ 20(a)); SEC v. Lure's, Inc., 365 F. Stpp. 1046, 1062-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (at least negligent
conduct of broker-dealer required before liability imposed).
The circuit courts of appeals differ regarding whether respondeat superior or the controlling
person doctrine apply in measuring the liability of a broker-dealer for the acts of an employee.
The controlling person provisions have supplanted the theory of respondeat superior in the
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F,2d 761 (3(d Cir.
1976); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993
(1976); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975);
Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 482 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973). Depending on the closeness of
the relationship between the controlling and controlled persons, the Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits may apply either controlling person liability or respondeat superior. See SEC v. Geon
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Sennott v. Rodman & Renchaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973); Halloway v. Howerdd, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,629 (6th Cir. 1976). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits use respon-
deat superior exclusively. See, e.g., Canas v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Bird v.
Ferry, 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, A Comparison of Control Person
Liability and Respondeat Superior: Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 CAL.
W.L. REV. 152 (1979).
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tion. 20 Furthermore, if the state claims are severed from the federal claims,
arbitration conducted before trial may resolve all questions to the parties'
satisfaction, which, as a result, could preclude the need to adjudicate any of
the federal securities claims. 21
Because arbitration under predispute agreements is allowed by the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act but prohibited by the federal securities acts in the case
of federal securities claims, and because it is critical to determine whether
all claims arising from a single investor-broker dispute will be resolved by
one tribunal, problems are created that are difficult to resolve rationally.
This Article will examine some of these problems and offer suggestions for
their resolution.
BACKGROUND LAW
The Federal Arbitration Act, 22 which creates federal substantive law
under the authority of the interstate commerce clause, 23 is central to
evaluating the validity of predispute arbitration agreements. Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act provides that a predispute arbitration agreement in a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce is valid. 24 Although
an arbitration clause may provide that it shall be governed by state law, it is
settled that federal law under the Federal Arbitration Act, not state law,
controls. 25
20. In the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, where the controlling person standard is the
measure of vicarious liability for a broker-dealer under federal securities law claims, when state
claims initially are joined with federal claims but later severed for arbitration, the broker-
dealer's liability in federal court will be strictly measured by the narrower controlling person
standard. See note 19 supra.
21. Such a resolution was the express hope of the court in Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d
at 543-44. See text accompanying notes 132-137 infra.
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
23. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-09 (2d Cir.
1959), dismissed by stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Romnes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp.
833, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
24. The full text of section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act reads as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such 'contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
25. Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101, 107 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976); Metro Indus. Parking Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d
382, 385 (2d Cir. 1961); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d at 409; In
re Ferrara, 441 F. Supp. 778, 780 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Romnes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp.
at 838.
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Arbitration is both favored by a strong congressional policy 26 and encour-
aged by the federal courts as an alternative means by which to resolve dis-
putes. 27 Consistent with this policy, section 3 of the Federal Arbitration
Act 28 limits the court's role in determining the scope of claims covered by
an arbitration agreement to deciding whether the party seeking arbitration
has made a claim governed by the agreement. 29 Courts liberally determine
the scope of claims covered by an arbitration agreement, 30 resolving all
26. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). To ensure the effectiveness of
arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act also confers on courts the power to appoint an arbitrator
when the arbitration clause is silent on this matter or when a vacancy occurs on a panel of
previously designated arbitrators. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). See Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn
Int'l, 442 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Courts are also empowered to vacate the arbitrator's
award when the arbitrator was partial or when the award was procured through fraud, corrup-
tion, or other "undue means." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976). See Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co.,
393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires arbitrators to
disclose to the parties any interests they have that might "create an impression of possible
bias"). The refusal of an arbitrator to disqualify himself or herself ordinarily will be reviewable
only after an award has been made. Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 1260, 1264
(2d Cir. 1973); Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exch., 292 F. Supp. 549, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); San Carlo Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 310 (2d
Cir. 1947). But see Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir.
1972) (rejecting the argument that a court cannot substitute a neutral arbitrator as an attempt
"to emasculate arbitration procedures under the federal act"). Finally, although the arbitration
situs is usually found in the agreement itself, Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S. A. Eteco,
530 F.2d 679, 680 (5th Cir. 1976), when a provision in an arbitration clause is unconscionable or
puts a party at a great disadvantage, the court should modify it. See Richards v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1976).
27. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974). The courts of appeals have
uniformly expressed approval of arbitration as a mode of private dispute resolution. See, e.g.,
Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 1979); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531
F.2d 585, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Southwest Indus. Import & Export, Inc. v. Wilmod Co., 524
F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1975); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 505
(1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 501 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1974); Aerojet General Corp. v. American Arb. Ass'n,
478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F.2d
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). Section 3 provides that the court shall stay its proceedings and refer
a dispute to arbitration upon determining that the issue raised by the suit is one that the
arbitration clause covers.
29. Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Bristol Farmers Mar-
ket & Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 589 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1978);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio By., 551 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir. 1977);
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield Ltd., 204 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953).
30. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d at 411 (arbitra-
tion clause covering a "complaint, controversy or question which may arise with respect to this
contract" was held to include a charge of fraud in the inducement); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v.
Econo-Can Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (clause requiring arbitration
of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to" the contract held to include claims of
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relationships,
fraud in the inducement, conversion, common law unconscionability, and unjust enrichment,
but not usury or restraint of trade); Local 1416, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Jostens, Inc., 250 F.
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doubts in favor of arbitration. 31 Indeed, a particular dispute will be arbitra-
ble unless the arbitration agreement cannot be rationally interpreted to
cover it. 32 Thus, the tendency of the courts is to find that practically any
dispute arising out of the parties' contractual relationship is within the scope
of the arbitration clause, and courts will find a dispute to be within the
arbitration provision's scope unless it is clearly not. 33
An important question raised by the Act is whether any legal or equitable
grounds will ever exist for revoking an arbitration clause. 34 Such grounds
Supp. 496, 500-01 (D. Minn. 1966) (arbitration clause covering problems of a collective bargain-
ing agreement's "interpretation" related to the scope of managerial decision-making). But see
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d at 985-86 (arbitration clause pur-
porting to cover "a dispute of any nature whatsoever" does not extend to the issue of whether
the parties ever had a meeting of the minds on the principal contract).
31. See cases cited in note 27 supra. In Gait v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711
(7th Cir. 1967), the court stated that the Federal Arbitration Act's policy is "to promote arbitra-
tion to accord with the intention of the parties and to ease court congestion. All doubts are to
be resolved in favor of arbitration .... Whenever possible, the courts will use the Federal
Arbitration Act to enforce agreements to arbitrate." Id. at 714 (citation omitted).
32. Rockdale Village, Inc. v. Public Serv. Employees Union No. 80, 605 F.2d 1290, 1295
(2d Cir. 1979); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d at 168; Bristol Farmers Market &
Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 589 F.2d at 1219; National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 551 F.2d at 140; United Eng'r & Foundry Employees Ass'n v. United
Eng'r & Foundry Co., 389 F. 2d 479, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1967). Although the Supreme Court, in
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), distinguished the
question of arbitration in the labor context from that in the commercial setting, id. at 578, the
lower courts have grafted labor law arbitration decisions onto commercial litigation cases. See,
e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d at 106.
33. For example, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967),
the Supreme Court held that fraud in the inducement of a contract was encompassed by lan-
gauge calling for arbitration of a "claim arising out of or relating to" the contract. Id. at '398.
Another court ruled that theft of business ideas, trade disparagement, and defamation were
covered by a similar arbitration clause in an agreement among New York Stock Exchange mem-
bers. Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1371-72 (D.D.C. 1972).
In securities cases, state claims have been held to be within the scope of arbitration agree-
ments. E.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 836
(7th Cir. 1977) (common law fraud, among others); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d at 544
(breach of contract); DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (breach of fiduciary
duty); Stockwell v. Reynold & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (negligence). It is
likely that the intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, and other torts arising out
of the contractual relationship are claims also referrable to arbitration under the standard
broker-dealer arbitration agreement.
34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Included in this issue is whether a party seeking to enforce an
arbitration agreement is in default in proceeding with such agreement. Id. § 3. Some older
decisions found "default," or waiver, simply when the party seeking arbitration did some act
inconsistent with the claim that the dispute should be arbitrated. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Lyles & Lang Constr. Co., 219 F.2d 328, 334 (4th Cir. 1955) (filing of a counterclaim);
Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1942)
(filing of an action at law); Cavac Campania Anonima Venezolana de Administracion y Counmer-
cio v. Board for Validation of German Bonds, 189 F. Supp. 205, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (filing of
an answer). The modern test for determining default is whether the opposing party has been
prejudiced. Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 572 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir.
1978); Gaulik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1975); Carolina
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clearly can exist because an agreement to arbitrate is simply a contract 35 that
will not be enforced if valid reasons exist for its revocation or if the parties
never consented to the agreement. 36 There must, however, be some nexus
between the arbitration clause and a ground for revocation. For example, in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,37 the United
States Supreme Court, presented with a claim of fraud in the inducement,
distinguished whether the claimed invalidity went to the contract as a whole
or just to its arbitration provision. The Court, interpreting the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, held that when the fraud puts at issue the validity of the arbi-
tration provision, the courts may decide the dispute. 38 If, however, the
validity of the entire contract is in question, a court must stay its proceed-
ings and submit the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
provision. 39
Although Prima Paint held that fraud must go to the arbitration clause
itself before that clause will not be enforced, the case did not involve a
situation in which a larger plan of fraud pervades the entire contract, includ-
ing the arbitration provision. It is clear that an arbitration clause is also
unenforceable when the agreement to arbitrate is part of a larger fraudulent
Throwing Co. v. S. & E. Novelty Corp., 442" F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1971); Hilti Inc. v.
Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968); Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordi, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d
Cir. 1968); American Broadcasting Cos. v. Ali, 434 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Prejudice has, however, rarely been shown. Indeed the only reported securities case in
which default was found is Liggett & Meyers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which the moving party obtained an answer and thousands of pages of
testimony and documents during pretrial discovery before moving for arbitration. Prejudice is
rare in the securities area primarily because federal securities claims are not arbitrable. See
notes 46-66 and accompanying text infra. Instead of being dismissed, such claims are, at most,
stayed pending arbitration of pendent claims. Discovery completed before the motion for arbi-
tration will still be available in the trial of federal securities claims.
35. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 404 n.12.
36. For example, if a signature on the arbitration agreement was forged, the contract is not
enforceable and arbitration cannot be compelled. Austin v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 349 F.
Supp. 615, 617 (M.D. Fla. 1972). But the lack of a signature is not controlling where other
evidence shows that there was a meeting of the minds. Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co.,
259 F. Supp. 688, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally International Union of Operating Eng'rs
Local 139 v. Carl A. Morse, Inc., 529 F.2d 574, 577-78 (7th Cir. 1976); Georgia Power Co. v.
Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d at 106; Local 103, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. RCA Corp.,
516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d Cir. 1975); Blake Constr. Co. v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 511 F.2d 324,
327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
37. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
38. Id. at 402-04. Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that the court will
compel arbitration when a party has failed to proceed to arbitration if "the making of the
agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). The Court in Prima Paint
grafted this § 4 test onto § 2, stating that "it is inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to
differ depending upon which party to the arbitration agreement first invokes the assistance of
federal court." 388 U.S. at 404.
39. 388 U.S. at 403-04. In the following cases, the courts have not voided arbitration agreements
when presented with general fraud allegations: Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1977); Macchiavelli v.
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scheme. In Mosely v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc.,a0 the petitioner
argued that contracts it entered into in Georgia were fraudulently designed
to force it to accept less than full value for its services and that a clause
requiring arbitration of disputes in New York was one means used to perpe-
trate the fraud. 41 The United States Supreme Court held that if fraud were
proven, there was a sufficient connection between the fraud and the arbitra-
tion clause to find-that clause unenforceable. 42 Similarly, an illegal contract
containing an arbitration clause closely related to the illegality will not be
referred to arbitration.4a Moreover, a breach of fiduciary duty may also
render the arbitration agreement unenforceable. 44 Thus, while Prima Paint
held that fraud must go to the arbitration clause itself, Moseley indicated
that an arbitration clause should fail with the rest of the contract when a
grand scheme of fraud permeates the entire contract.45
THE WILKO v. SWAN DOCTRINE
Application to Action Based upon the Federal Securities Acts
Despite the general encouragement of arbitration under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, 46  in Wilko v. Swan 47 the Supreme Court erected an absolute
bar to predispute agreements that would compel arbitration of federal se-
curities law claims. In Wilko, a customer sued his brokerage firm for damages
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21 (E. D. Cal. 1974); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp.
215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
40. 374 U.S. 167 (1963). The Court, in Prima Paint, implicitly upheld Moseley. 388 U.S. at
404 n. 12.
41. 374 U.S. at 170-71.
42. Id. at 171.
43. See Comprehensive Merchant Catalogs, Inc. v. Madison Sales Corp., 521 F.2d 1210,
1213 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Weinrott, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 197, 298 N.E.2d 42, 46, 344 N.Y.S.2d
848, 855 (1973); Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 A.D. 2d 280, 284, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932, 937-38 (1972).
44. See Chattanooga Mailers Local 92 v. Chattanooga News-Free Press Co., 524 F.2d 1305,
1313 (6th Cir. 1975); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir. 1971).
45. In Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 378 (1977), defendant, a brokerage firm engaged in a confidential relationship of trust with
plaintiff, an aged and unschooled customer, placed a lending agreement containing an arbitra-
tion clause before her for signature. Knowing that the plaintiff was completely unaware of all
aspects of the document, defendant misrepresented its nature and content to plaintiff and did
not advise her of the arbitration clause. In applying California contract law, the appellate court
held that the defendant, a fiduciary, obtained an unfair advantage over plaintiff in securing the
arbitration clause. Id. at 31, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
The Main holding rested on the conclusion that the arbitration clause was biased against
plaintiff. Courts have the authority to void unfair arbitration provisions without voiding the
agreement to arbitrate altogether. See note 26 supra. Absent unfair terms controlling the arbi-
tration procedure, it is doubtful that the arbitration agreement by itself is a material fact that a
fiduciary must disclose. Unconscionable ter-ns in an arbitration agreement also should not be a
basis for denying arbitration altogether so long as the court can devise fair arbitration proce-
dures.
46. See notes 3-6, 26-27, and accompanying text supra.
47. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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under section 12(2) of the Securities Act for misrepresentations and omis-
sions of information concerning the sale of stock. 48 The defendant broker-
age firm moved to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration pro-
vision in the customer's margin agreement. 49 At issue was the effect of
section 14 of the Securities Act, which provides that any provision, stipula-
tion, or condition binding a person acquiring a security to waive compliance
with any provision of the Securities Act is void. 50 The question before the
Court was, therefore, whether the right to bring suit under the Securities
Act is such a provision that cannot be waived.
To effectuate the Securities Act's express policy of protecting investors
by requiring issuers and broker-dealers to provide full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities, 51 the Court concluded that section 12(2) was
created to furnish investors with a "special right" more protective than rights
at common law and held that trial could not be waived. 52 The Court
reasoned that a special right existed because a broker-dealer must assume
the burden of proving lack of scienter under section 12(2), 5 3 and because
under the Securities Act suit may be brought in federal court, where the
investor has a wide choice of venue and nation-wide service of process.5 4
The Court stated that these advantages are lost when the investor enters
into a predispute arbitration agreement. " Furthermore, the Court
48. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides that any person who
sells a security, . . . by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or
of oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1952) (amended in 1954 to include the words "offers or" before the word
"sells").
49. The arbitration clause provided:
Any controversy arising between us under this contract shall be determined by
arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Law of the State of New York, and under the
rules of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the State
of New York, or of the American Arbitration Association, or of the Arbitration
Committee of the New York Stock Exchange or such other Exchange as may have
jurisdiction over the matter in dispute, as I may elect. Any arbitration hereunder
shall be before at least three arbitrators.
346 U.S. 432 n.15.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1952).
51. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); S. REP. No. 47,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
52. 346 U.S. at 430-31.
53. Id. at 431.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 435. Further disadvantages to arbitration found by the Court included the facts
that arbitrators are without judicial instruction on the law, arbitrators may make judgments
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suggested that at the time such agreements are made the investor may be
unable "to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon
his adversary." 56  For these reasons, the Wilko Court concluded that Con-
gress must have intended section 14 to apply to waivers of judicial trial.5 7
Accordingly, it held that the predispute agreement to arbitrate claims arising
under the Securities Act was effectively a waiver of provisions of the Se-
curities Act and was, therefore, void. 5
8
without explaining their reasoning or providing a complete record of the proceedings, and the
judicial power to vacate an arbitrator's award is limited. Id. at 435-37.
56. Id. at 435.
57. Id. at 437.
58. 346 U.S. at 438.
Courts have fashioned one exception, and suggested another, to the rule that predispute
arbitration agreements are void.
The first exception to Wilko allows members of national securities exchanges to enter into
valid arbitration agreements. The leading case, Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), explained its conclusion that such agreements are binding between exchange
members, stating, inter alia, that the Securities Act was not meant to protect "dealers from the
improprieties of fellow dealers .... It was assumed that dealers could fend for themselves; it
was the investing public that was in need of protection." Id. at 772.
The rule of Brown has been applied to various similar fact situations. See, e.g., Muh v.
Newberger, Loeb & Co., 540 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1976) (former New York Stock Exchange
members required to arbitrate dispute in accordance with exchange rules); Coenen v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (2d Cir.) (exchange members compelled to arbitrate
securities dispute where claim arose before one party became a member), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 949 (1972); Axelrod & Co. v. Kordick, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 841-43 (2d Cir.
1971) (non-member firm can compel member firm to arbitrate securities controversy). The rule
has even been extended to enforce arbitration agreements between exchange members.and
their employees. See, e.g., Katz v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 637, 637-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (securities claim of former employee of member firm against firm stayed so
that arbitration might be sought in accordance with agreement to arbitrate under stock exchange
rules).
A number of courts have suggested a second exception, which holds that when knowledge-
able parties deal at arms length, there is no reason to deny enforcement of a predispute arbitra-
tion agreement. Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Wilko
rule did not apply where two sophisticated parties entered into securities arbitration agreement
after arms length bargaining, and party seeking to avoid the provision was its author); GCA
Corp. v. Coler, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,339, at 91,815
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (arbitration agreement is valid when entered into by parties dealing at arms
length and from equal bargaining positions, because public interest is not at stake).
Some courts, however, have declined to apply the "sophisticated investor" exception. In
Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), limited partners of a brokerage firm
sought to avoid an arbitration provision contained in the partnership agreement when they sued
the firm and the general partners, charging federal securities law violations. The court, having
characterized the limited partners as investors with no voice in firm management, denied arbi-
tration. The court stated that although some limited partners may be sophisticated, many are
not, and held that courts should not be required in every case to rule on the sophistication of
the parties. Rather, the court concluded that an objective test is more appropriate, and held
that limited partners are protected by the federal securities acts to the same extent as is the
general investing public. Id. at 369. See Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265
(W.D. Tex. 1974) (federal securities laws do not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophis-
ticated investors).
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Although the Court's decision in Wilko concerned the arbitrability of
claims brought only under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, courts have
subsequently held that claims of violations of sections 559 and 1760 of the
Securities Act are non-arbitrable. In addition, section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act contains a provision similar to that in section 14 of the Securities Act. 61
By analogy to Wilko, it is generally accepted that section 29(a) renders void
arbitration agreements for claims based on the Exchange Act, 62  and predis-
pute arbitration agreements have been held void with respect to sections
7,63 10(b),64 and 15(c)(1) 65 of that Act. Similarly, agreements to arbitrate
claimed violations of various stock exchange rules have been held void. 6 6  It
is doubtful, therefore, that a court will hold arbitrable any of the causes of
action arising out of either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.
The Supreme Court, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,6 7 however, advanced
the argument that Wilko does not apply to private claims not expressly es-
tablished by the Exchange Act. 68 The Scherk Court stated that Wilko con-
cerned a suit brought under a section of the Securities Act that expressly
"provides a defrauded purchaser with the 'special right' of a remedy for civil
59. For violations of § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) (registration requirements), see
Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282
F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
60. For violations of § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976) (prohibition of fraud in interstate transac-
tions), see Davend Corp. v. Michael, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,540 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Frier Indus. Inc. v. Glickman, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,810 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
61. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976), provides: "Any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void."
62. See cases cited in notes 63-65 infra.
63. For violations of § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976) (margin requirement violations), see
Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
64. For violations of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979) (anti-fraud provisions), see Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
65. For violations of § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976) (prohibition of use of manipula-
tive devices), see Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974).
66. See Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974) (New York Stock
Exchange Rule 325); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New York Stock
Exchange Rules 345.17, 345.19, and 405). The New York Stock Exchange Rules were adopted
by the exchange as a prerequisite to its registration pursuant to sections 6(d) and 19 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d), 78s (1976). A split of authority exists as to whether a private
right of action lies for violations of these rules. Compare Starkman, supra, (private right for
violation of some exchange rules implied by § 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976))
with Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411 (D. Minn. 1977) (private right not implied by § 27
because Congress did not contemplate causes of action arising under exchange rules).
67. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
68. Id. at 513-14.
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liability," and that no statutory counterpart to section 12(2) exists in the Ex-
change Act. 69 The Court reasoned that although case law has established
that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 create an implied private right of action,
this right is not "special" because it was not legislatively formulated. 7 Stat-
ing that the Wilko decision had established the significance of a "special
right," the Scherk Court suggested, but did not decide, that agreements to
arbitrate disputes arising out of implied rights under federal securities law
may be valid. 71
Nevertheless, lower courts have rejected the Scherk suggestion, regarding
as not dispositive the fact that the right was legislatively created. 72 The
Third Circuit has explicitly stated that neither the differences between the
rights granted in the Securities Act or the Exchange Act nor any considera-
tion of policy warrant such a distinction, 73 the Seventh Circuit has asserted
that policy considerations mandate the application of Wilko to rule 10b-5
situations, 74 and the SEC has recently stated that Wilko applies to arbitra-
tion agreements for implied rights of action arising under the Exchange
Act. 75
A Comparison -The Arbitration of Antitrust Law Claims
The Wilko rationale for not enforcing predispute arbitration agreements
for federal securities claims differs from the reasons given for the invalidity
of such agreements under antitrust law. For antitrust claims, courts have
referred to the broad range of public interest affected by private antitrust
actions. 76 They have determined that a claim arising under antitrust law is
not merely a private matter because private antitrust actions are an integral
part of the design of the antitrust laws to promote the national interest in a
competitive economy. 77 Accordingly, courts have reasoned that it is doubt-
69. Id. at 513, quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431.
70. Id. (citations omitted). A private right of action has been implied for claims under
§ 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971).
71. 417 U.S. at 513.
72. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d at 835; Ayres v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d at 536-37.
73. Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d at 536.
74. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d at 835.
75. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15984, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,122. The SEC criticized the use of arbitration agreements that purport to bind
customers to arbitrate all future disputes with a broker-dealer. Id. at 81,976-78. It reasoned that
because the language of arbitration agreements does not reflect the limited enforceability of
arbitration provisions, many investors may be unaware of their right to a judicial forum for the
pursuit of claims arising under the federal securities laws. Id. at 81,975. As a result, the SEC
felt that it was incumbent upon those who include arbitration clauses in agreements with cus-
tomers to provide adequate information about such rights in order to make the clauses not
misleading. Id.
76. See cases cited in note 77 infra.
77. Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978);
Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater
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ful that Congress could have intended such claims to be resolved in a non-
judicial forum. 78 Another reason given for nonenforceability of predispute
arbitration agreements in antitrust cases is that the courts feel far better
suited than arbitrators to resolve the complex legal and factual issues and
extensive evidentiary questions. 79 Finally, because antitrust laws regulate
the business community, 80 courts question the propriety of entrusting the
decision of antitrust issues to commercial arbitrators who are frequently cho-
sen for their business expertise. 81
The Wilko opinion, focusing only on the individual investor's forfeiture of
rights provided under federal securities law, did not discuss whether the
broad policy considerations referred to in the antitrust actions are relevant to
securities cases. Assuming that fair arbitration procedures protective of rights
given by the Securities Act can be implemented, 82 the question arises
whether the policy considerations and public interests evident in antitrust
cases would still preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements in the se-
curities field.
The answer to this query is unclear. In Allegaert v. Perot, 83 the Second
Circuit considered the antitrust policy grounds and denied arbitration in an
action involving securities issues. The policy issues were considered because
the case involved "no mere dispute between private parties," '8 4  but rather a
Co., 426 F.2d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 1970); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire &
Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1968).
Courts have also held that patent law claims are not arbitrable under a predispute arbitra-
tion agreement. Essentially the same reason has been given-the public interest in questions of
patent validity and infringement renders such issues inappropriate for arbitration. See Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1970); Foster Wheeler
Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Diematic Mfg. Corp.
v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516
F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp.,
204 F. Supp. 141, 143 (W.D.S.C. 1962), affd, 315 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963).
78. Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d at 117; Cobb v. Lewis,
488 F.2d at 47; American Safety Equip. Co. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d at 826-27.
79. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
80. See § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) and § I of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1976), which define the subject of their regulation as "trade or commerce." "Trade or
commerce" has been defined by the Supreme Court to include "any occupation, employment or
business .. .carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain .... United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1950) (emphasis added).
81. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
82. See notes 155-164 and accompanying text supra.
83. 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
84. Id. at 436. In Allegaert, the trustee in bankruptcy of du Pont Waltson, Inc., brought
suit against, inter alia, Perot, Electronic Data Systems Corporation, du Pont Glore Forgan,
Inc., the New York Stock Exchange, and several directors of du Pont Walston, Inc., alleging
violations of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Bankruptcy Act, state corporation law
and the common law. Id. at 434. The claims arose out of a complex scheme to defraud du Pont
Walston, Inc.
Perot was the controlling stockholder of Electronic Data Systems Corporation. Id. at 433. He
invested large sums of money in and took control of du Pont Clore Forgan, Inc., a brokerage
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claim asserted on behalf of hundreds of creditors in connection with a cele-
brated brokerage house failure. The court stated that the case, like antitrust
cases, raised broad policy questions more adequately handled by the federal
courts than by arbitrators. 85
Allegaert is, however, an exception; it is questionable whether a single
investor-broker dispute involves policy concerns similar to those raised in
Allegaert. The second policy-disinclination to allow arbitration in the pres-
ence of complex legal and factual issues more appropriate for judicial
resolution-is inapplicable because the vast majority of investor disputes in-
volve rule 10b-5 violations, 86 which present legal issues no more complex
than common law fraud 8 7 and are not typically factually complex.88 The
third policy-distrust of commercial entrepreneurs to judge themselves in
arbitration--is particularly inappropriate in securities law disputes because a
fundamental design of the securities laws is the promotion of self-regulation
firm. Soon thereafter, when du Pont Glore Forgan, Inc., was on the brink of insolvency, Perot
conceived a realignment plan whereby du Pont Walston, Inc., in which Perot was a minority
stockholder, would assume immense du Pont Glore Forgan liabilities, thereby protecting it from
future loss. Id. at 434. This plan was railroaded through the du Pont Walston Board of Directors
in a meeting at which misrepresentations were made. The New York Stock Exchange concealed
its conclusion that the plan would render du Pont Walston insolvent in a short time, allegedly
because of fear of the liability it would accrue if du Pont Glore Forgan, Inc., were liquidated.
Id. The defendants contended that the suit should be stayed pending arbitration as provided for
by the constitutions of the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange, and
the realignment agreement. Id. at 434-35.
85. Id. at 437.
86. 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 1 & Foreword at ix (rev. ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as JACOBS]; E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SECUITIES LITIGATION 75 (1974).
87. The elements of a cause of action in fraud at common law are, generally: a false rep-
resentation of fact known to be untrue by the party making it; intent of that party to deceive
and to induce the other party to act on the misrepresentation; justifiable reliance by the other
party; and damage to that party as a result of his or her reliance. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
685-86 (4th ed. 1971). The elements of a rule 10b-5 action are less clear. Indeed, one commen-
tator has stated "[that the ingredients of a 10b-5 cause of action have not been determined
with a degree of accuracy . . . would be considered an understatement by many." JACOBS, supra
note 86, § 36, at 2-2 to 2-3. Nevertheless, it appears that the elements of a 10b-5 claim include
misrepresentation of a material fact, privity, scienter, reliance and damages. 3A H. BLOOMEN-
THAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.21-22 (rev. ed. 1979). The requirement
of proving certain of these elements has, however, been relaxed. JACOBS, supra note 86, § 36,
at 2-6. In short, the legal issues involved in fraud and rule 10b-5 cases are similar.
88. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), presents a typical fact situation. Wilko claimed that
he was induced to purchase 1,600 shares of stock of Air Associates, Inc., by a brokerage firm's
false representations that Air Associates had merged with Borg Warner Corporation, thereby
increasing the value of the stock and causing large financial interests to buy the stock. Wilko v.
Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). It was also alleged that Page, a director, counsel,
and stockholder of Air Associates, was at the same time selling his stock-some of which was
purchased by Wilko. Id. The central issue of fact was whether these representations were pro-
hibited by § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C § 77(2) (1976), as either untrue
statements of material facts or a failure to state material facts necessary to make the statements
not misleading. 107 F. Supp. at 76-77.
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by the securities industry. 89 It is consistent with this policy to encourage
the involvement of the industry in dispute resolution by arbitration.
Finally, the first policy-resolution of important issues in the public
forum--also does not realistically apply to the simple investor-broker dis-
pute. Where a business has engaged in conduct violative of the antitrust
laws, literally thousands of people may be affected and great economic dam-
age inflicted. 90 On the other hand, investor-broker disputes often impact
no one but the parties involved. 91 Because of the smaller number of per-
sons who might be adversely affected by the outcome of most disputes,
there is clearly a lesser interest in public resolution of investor-broker dis-
putes. In these cases, any public interest in being informed may be out-
weighed by the advantages of arbitration. 92 Even if public notice is deemed
89. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1934). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349-57 (1962); W.
DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940); E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION
OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 231-32 (1965). See generally Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244 (1963); Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PRoB. 661 (1964); Westwood &
Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROR. 518 (1952).
Long before the enactment of the Exchange Act, stock exchanges were regulating the admis-
sion and conduct of exchange members. Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry:
The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 661, 664
(1964). As a result of economic changes, the growth of stock exchanges and their impact upon
the economy, and 'the exchanges' inability to curb abuses through self-regulation, Congress
enacted the Exchange Act. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934); H. R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934). The beginning of governmental regulation did not,
however, totally displace self-regulation. The intent of the legislature was to give the exchanges
"the initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining to the administration of
their ordinary affairs .... S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). Congress further
stated that "[i]t is only where [the exchanges] fail adequately to provide protection to investors
that the Commission is authorized to step in and compel them to do so." Id.
90. See, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906);
Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (SD.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964). In both Chattanooga Foundry and Atlantic City, public utilities
brought suit for damages resulting from their purchase of overpriced materials sold in violation
of federal antitrust law. The issue in each case was whether the overcharges, admittedly shifted
by the utilities to their customers, must be deducted from the amount of damages otherwise
collectible from the suppliers. Conceivably millions of people who paid excessive charges had an
interest in the outcome of this antitrust litigation.
91. Many investor-broker disputes involve only a few persons. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. at 429 (one plaintiff and two defendants); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (one plaintiff and one defendant); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320
F. Supp. 598, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (two plaintiffs and two defendants). Yet other class actions
involve thousands of parties. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968)
(approximately 2,200 plaintiffs). For the large cases, such as Green and Allegaert, the first
policy-resolution of issues in the public forum-may be present.
92. The primary advantage of arbitration is the relatively speedy and inexpensive disposition
of disputes compared with judicial resolution. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. American
Arb. Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Co.,
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942); Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 707,
552 P.2d 1178, 1182, 131 Cal, Rptr. 882, 886 (1976). See notes 3-6, 22-23, and accompanying
text supra.
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important, notice could be satisfied simply by requiring all arbitrations to be
reported to the SEC, rather than by rendering arbitration agreements abso-
lutely ineffective. 93
ARBITRATION OF PENDENT STATE LAW CLAIMS
Because investor-broker accounts frequently involve both a contractual
and a fiduciary relationship, 9a injured investors commonly assert-in addi-
tion to claims of common law fraud 95 -state law claims for breach of con-
tract, breach of fiduciary duty, 96 and damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 97 State law claims arising from securities dealings often are
joined with federal securities law claims.98 The primary reason for pleading
state causes of action along with federal securities claims is to recover pu-
nitive damages, because although punitive damages are not recoverable
under the federal securities acts, they may be recovered under pendent
state claims. 9 9
93. The "public interest" exception to arbitration is further undercut by the number of
securities actions that are arbitrable, such as disputes between members of securities exchanges
and brokerage firms or between sophisticated investors. See cases cited in note 58 infra.
94. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978). It has been held, however, that where a sophisticated investor made all his investment
decisions on his own, no fiduciary relationship existed between the investor and his broker.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 371-72 (7th Cir, 1978).
95. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F. 2d at 1021; DeHart v. Moore,
424 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 762,
762 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
96. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d at 1021; Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d at 370-72; Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F.
Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
97. Cf. Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Stpp. at 764-65. In Greitzer, plaintiff
sought damages for mental distress predicated upon claims involving the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act, and common law deceit. 326 F. Supp. at 762-63. The court denied recovery for
emotional distress under the Exchange Act because § 28(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1976), limits recovery to "actual damages", and under the Securities Act because the language
of § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976), strongly implies that recovery is allowable only for damages of a
financial nature. 326 F. Supp. at 763-64. In denying recovery for emotional distress under the
common law deceit claim, the Greitzer court concluded that no "outrageous conduct" had been
alleged, and therefore no proper claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress had been
pleaded under California law. Id. at 765.
98. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F. 2d at 1021-22 (contract, fiduciary
duty and fraud with rule 10b-5); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d at 41, 45
(fiduciary duty with rule 10b-5), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Macchiavelli v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. at 23 (contract with SEC Regulation T-promulgated pursuant to
§ 7 of the Exchange Act-and rule 10b-5); Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp.
at 762 (fraud and emotional distress with § 17(a) of the Securities Act and 10b-5); Maheu v.
Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (fiduciary duty with §§ 5, 12(2) and 17
of the Securities Act and rule 10b-5).
99. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. Another reason concerns the standard of
liability in agency situations. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
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The language of the securities acts is of no help in determining whether
pendent state claims are arbitrable, and the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed this question. Consequently, the federal courts have been left to
formulate their own guidelines when nonarbitrable federal securities law
claims are joined with causes of action under state law.
Arbitrable Pendent Claims
Where both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are present in a single
action, the general presumption is that the court should sever the action so
that all arbitrable claims are arbitrated and all nonarbitrable claims are liti-
gated. 100 The rationale for severance was stated by one court to be the
desire not to deprive the parties of either their contractual rights or their
rights under the Federal Arbitration Act. 101 While courts often do recog-
nize that severance of substantially related claims may prolong disputes and
result in duplication of effort, they will subordinate the goal of expediency to
their duty to enforce an individual's basic right to contract, and the action
will be severed. The general presumption in favor of severance, however,
has had to yield in numerous cases to countervailing considerations that ren-
der severance impracticable or inappropriate.
Pendent claims of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty have
been severed from securities claims and arbitrated in every case in which
the issue of severance has been raised. For example, in Macchiavelli v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 102 plaintiff brought suit against a broker-dealer
with whom he maintained a margin account, alleging breach of contract,
violation of regulation T, 103 and violation of rule 10b-5. 104 The breach of
contract claim was based on defendant's purported refusal to allow plaintiff
to withdraw funds from the account in excess of a 30% margin requirement
set by the broker. 105 The allegation of violation of rule 10b-5 stemmed both
100. See e.g., Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 680 (5th Cir.
1976) (nonarbitrable antitrust claims severed from other arbitrable claims); Council of Western
Elec. Technical Employees-Nat'l v. Western Elec. Co., 238 F.2d 892, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1956)
(where defendant in a labor dispute forfeited its right to arbitrate certain issues, but not others,
the action was severed); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. at 30 (rule
10b-5 claim severed from arbitrable contract claim).
101. Younker Bros., Inc. v. Standard Constr. Co., 241 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
102. 384 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1979).
104. 384 F. Supp. at 23-24. In addition, there were allegations of violation of other federal
securities rules and regulations that were not specified in plaintiff's complaint.
105. Id. at 23. Plaintiff had a margin account with defendant. A margin account is one in
which an investor makes purchases of securities on credit. Under federal law, stock exchange
rules, and agreements between investors and brokers, an investor buying on credit must ini-
tially pay a specified part of the purchase price of securities in cash in order to receive an
extension of credit from the broker for the unpaid balance. The percentage of the purchase
price the investor must pay is the "margin requirement." The federal margin requirements are
set forth in Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1979). However, the stock exchanges are free to
superimpose their own margin requirements upon those of the regulation. Regulation T § 7(e),
12 C.F.R. § 220.7 (e) (1979). In addition, a broker may set his or her own margin requirements
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from the defendant's alleged employment of fraudulent and manipulative de-
vices in notifying plaintiff of funds needed to meet a margin maintenance
requirement, 10 6 and from defendant's submission of false and deceptive ac-
count status reports to another brokerage firm to prevent transfer of plain-
tiff's account. 107 The complaint did not specify the basis for the claimed
violation of the regulation T margin rules. 108
Defendant moved to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration of
plaintiff's claims pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement contained in
the investor-broker margin account agreement. 109 Although it recognized
that the rule 10b-5 claim was nonarbitrable, 110 the court held that both the
claimed violation of regulation T and the contract claim were arbitrable. I"
The question became, therefore, whether the action should be severed, with
the arbitrable claims arbitrated and the nonarbitrable claims tried, or
whether the court should retain jurisdiction over the entire cause of ac-
tion. 112 While recognizing that all the claims were related, the court held
that the rule 10b-5 claim was "clearly severable from the other claims, both
factually and legally," 113 reasoning that severance "would serve well the
purposes of both the Securities and Exchange Act ...and the Federal Arbi-
tration Act." 114
Upon closer inspection, the situation in Macchiavelli indicates that the
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims were not as distinct as the court
thought. 115 Certainly, the contract claim and the rule 10b-5 claim based on
when entering into a relationship with an investor, Regulation T §§ 7(b), (e), 12 C.F.R. §§
220.7(b), (e) (1979), and, generally, brokers do require investors to maintain their cash contribu-
tions at a certain minimum percentage of the market value of stocks in the investor's account.
Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. at 29 n.l. This percentage is called the
maintenance level. In Macchiavelli, the plaintiff was required to maintain a 30% maintenance
level at all times, but he could withdraw excess funds over that amount. Id.
106. 384 F. Supp. at 24. When, as a result of a declining stock market, the investor's cash
investment falls below the statutory, stock exchange, or contractually-agreed-upon maintenance
level, the broker can call upon the investor for additional investment of cash. If the investor is
unable to make additional contributions, the broker may liquidate a portion of the account to
reestablish the maintenance level. It was alleged in Macchiavelli that defendant used fraudulent
devices in notifying plaintiff of the maintenance level of plaintiff's account, consequently forcing
unnecessary liquidations to plaintiff's detriment.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 30-31.
109. Id. at 24. The margin agreement read as follows: "'[A]ny controversy arising out of or
relating to my account, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the breach
thereof shall be settled by arbitration." Id. at 25.
110. Id. at 27, citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
111. Id. at 30-31.
112. Id. at 31.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Certainly, there is some basis for the court's conclusion that the contract claim was
severable from the rule 10b-5 claim in that to maintain an action for breach of contract, a
plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of a contract, fulfillment of any conditions prece-
dent to the defendant's duty to perform, and defendant's failure to perform. On the other hand,
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defendant's use of manipulative devices in notifying plaintiff of the funds
needed to meet margin requirements were not so "clearly severable." Al-
though it is true that the legal elements needed to prove each claim differ,
very similar facts must have been put into evidence to prove either claim.
For example, the contract provided that "[plaintiff] will maintain such mar-
gins as [defendant] may in [defendant's] discretion require . . . [defendant]
may, . . . in [defendant's] discretion ...sell any or all property held in any
of [plaintiff's] accounts ...without actual notice to [plaintiff]." 1 16 This lan-
guage is also crucial to the rule 10b-5 claim predicated on defendant's use of
manipulative devices in notifying plaintiff of maintenance requirements, be-
cause under this contract provision, it may be that no notification was neces-
sary. Evidence of this contractual language would, therefore, be relevant in
determining whether the defendant did, indeed, act in a fraudulent manner
within the scope of rule 10b-5, as well as whether the defendant breached
the contract. Thus, the court in Macchiavelli seems to have grossly over-
stated the factual and legal severability of the contract and rule 10b-5 claims.
Severability was also at issue in DeHart v. Moore, 117 in which plaintiff
charged that defendants misrepresented the amount of commissions they
were to receive by acting as plaintiff's agents. Defendants were charged
with violating rule 10b-5, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary
duty. 118 Although the court recognized that the claims were based on sub-
stantially similar factual allegations, it held the pendent state law claims sev-
erable because the requisite mental state differed for the federal and state
claims; 119 whereas negligence could support a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty and no mental state need be shown for breach of contract, scienter is
an element of an action under rule 10b-5. 120
Other cases exist in which securities law and state law issues have been
deemed too close factually or legally to permit severance;121 however,
severance seems to be the rule rather than the exception. 122 Although the
the elements of a rule 10b-5 action are misrepresentation of a material fact, privity, scienter,
reliance, and damages. The factual foundations of either legal theory overlap, however, quite
substantially.
116. 384 F. Supp. at 32.
117. 424 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
118. Id. at 56-57.
119. Id. at 57.
120, Id.
121. See, e.g., Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977). Cf. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d at 1030-31.
122. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In
Stockwell, common law claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, were joined with federal
securities law claims. The court noted:
[T]he relief sought in each of these [common law] counts is based on the same
transactions which are the subject of the Securities Exchange Act counts, which
must be determined by the court under the Wilko doctrine. There would appear to
be little purpose in having both the court proceeding and the arbitration going on at
the same time, and doubtless the ultimate determination by the court of [the se-
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Macchiavelli and DeHart courts stated that there can be no severance unless
the factual and legal issues are clearly severable, the apparent rule of these
cases is that notwithstanding substantial overlap of issues, if the federal claim
requires some additional fact-finding, the claim is severable. Thus, even
though a majority of the issues are identical and duplicative, severance is
justified if some difference in the claims can be identified.
Fraud-The Truly "Intertwined" Claim
The difficulty in finding some rationale to support severance of substan-
tially overlapping claims is most pronounced in cases involving both rule
10b-5 violations and pendent state claims for common law fraud. In these
situations no coherent theory to resolve conflicting policies has developed,
and, as a result, courts disagree whether such intertwined claims are sever-
able. Those courts permitting severance and arbitration of state law claims
simply hold that the non-waiver provisions of section 14 of the Securities
Act 123 and section 29(a) of the Exchange Act 124 bar arbitration only for
those causes of action based on the federal securities laws. 125 Under this
approach, "the non-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws . .. do
not apply to pendent state claims, and . . . those claims are . . . subject to
valid arbitration agreements." 126
Other courts have, however, refused to grant arbitration of pendent state
law fraud claims because those claims are based on, or "intertwined with,"
the same factual allegations as the federal securities fraud claims. This line of
authority has its genesis in Shapiro v. Jaslow, 127 in which it was alleged that
defendants generally had failed to follow either the principles of the Se-
curities Act, the Exchange Act, the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, the
curities law claims] would have a definite bearing on the outcome of the arbitration
proceedings.
Id. at 220. Nevertheless, the court did not refuse to allow the common law issues to go to
arbitration, but stayed arbitration pending the court's resolution of the securities claims. Id.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976). See text accompanying note 50 supra.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78 cc(a) (1976). See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
125. An example of this reasoning is Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), in which plaintiff sought recovery for alleged violations of §§ 17(a) and 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7(q)(a), 771(2) (1976), § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), and § 352c of the General Business Law of
New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352c (McKinney 1968). 265 F. Supp. at 899. The state
statute prohibited fraudulent practices in language similar to that of rule 10b-5. It was argued
that because the pendent claims relied on a state statute patterned after the federal securities
law, the court should read into the state statute the non-waiver provisions of the federal stat-
utes. Id. at 901. The court rejected this argument, apparently reasoning that the statutory
non-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws simply have no application to claims not
based on those federal laws. Id.
A recent SEC release appears to agree with those cases permitting severance and arbitration
of pendent state law claims. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15984, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,977.
126. Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1974).
127. 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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National Association of Securities Dealers, or the common law. 128 The
court acknowledged that it was empowered to compel arbitration of the
common law claims, but held that such relief was impractical, if not impossi-
ble, as the court could not separate the common law from the federal law
issues. 129 The Shapiro court reasoned that it could not permit the defend-
ant to thwart the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over federal
securities law claims by compelling arbitration of an ancillary dispute1 30 and
stated that whether certain issues were federal securities matters or claims at
common law was a question best left for judicial resolution. 131
The Shapiro result was accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 132 a case involving a contract for the merger of the P.J. Parker Com-
pany with the Tandy Corporation. Tandy refused to consummate the
merger, charging that Parker's net worth was substantially less than rep-
resented. 133 Plaintiff, the representative of Parker's shareholders, brought
an action against Tandy, charging four counts of breach of contract, one
count of federal and state securities law violations, and one count of common
law fraudulent misrepresentation. 134 The court directed that the contract
clause be arbitrated and that the federal and state securities claims and the
common law fraud claim be stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration
proceedings. 135 Thus, while some pendent state claims were held arbitra-
ble, the pendent claims of fraud were not.
128, Id. at 599-600.
129. Id. at 600.
130. Id.
131 Id.
The interesting point in Shapiro is that the complaint failed to plead each cause of action
separately so that the court could determine the nature of the relief sought. Perhaps this appar-
ent failure to satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and not the mere similarity of the common law and securities claims, prompted the court
to deny arbitration. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (e), 9(b). Rule 9(b), providing that "[iln all aver-
ments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity," FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), applies to the pleading of an action premised on .rule 10b-5
as well as actions alleging common law fraud. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393,
397 (9th Cir. 1973); Segel v., Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 608 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, if the Shapiro
Court had known exactly what claims were being made, and approximately what facts would be
proven to support those claims, it may not have concluded that it was impossible to separate the
common law issues from the federal issues.
132. 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977). See also Wick v. Atlan-
tic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979).
133. 543 F.2d at 541.
134. Id. at 542 n.L
135. Id. at 544. In a footnote, the court also noted that in some situations arbitration should
be stayed pending resolution of federal securities claims. Id. at 544 n.6. See Frier Indus., Inc.
v. Glickman, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Furthermore, if the claims are factually and legally independent, arbitration and trial may occur
simultaneously. See Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S. A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1976); Macchiavelli v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
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The court viewed the rule 10b-5 and common law fraud claims not as
intertwined" with the contract claims, but as "dependent" upon them. 136
The Sibley court concluded that the claims followed a logical sequence: first,
a claim for specific performance of the contract for merger; second, an asser-
tion that the contract was ambiguous, and should be reformed; and third,
that Parker was fraudulently induced by defendants' oral representations to
enter into a written contract different than previous oral representations. In
holding that all of the policy reasons supporting arbitration apply when arbi-
tration may establish that a securities claim does not exist, the court stated
that if the first or second contract claim was resolved in plaintiff's favor, the
third claim would be moot. 137 The court reasoned that policies behind the
Federal Arbitration Act and considerations of judicial economy required that
Parker's contractual claim be submitted to arbitration and that the federal
securities law claim be stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration.
The results reached by courts when presented with federal securities
claims and pendent state claims in the presence of a predispute arbitration
agreement underscore the extreme difficulty of reconciling the contradictory
policies underlying the federal securities and arbitration acts. Under the cur-
rent state of the law there can be no wholly satisfactory resolution of prob-
lems presented by the rule of law initially stated by Wilko v. Swan.
Arbitration of Pendent State Law Claims
Is the Unsolved Problem
Case law demonstrates that the inherent conflict between the federal se-
curities acts and the Arbitration Act in the present legislative scheme pre-
sents a dilemma concerning the arbitration of pendent state law claims.
Under existing statutory interpretation, federal securities claims are not ar-
bitrable, while state claims may be fully arbitrable. When the state claim is
present in the federal action because of pendent jurisdiction, a court can
theoretically pursue the following alternatives. First, it could require all
claims to be tried. Second, it could require all claims to be arbitrated.
Third, it could require the securities claims to be tried and the pendent
claims arbitrated. None of these alternatives is adequate.
The first alternative, trying all claims-chosen by the court in Shapiro
and in part by the court in Sibley-simply ignores the contractual and
statutory right to arbitration. While the Sibley holding was well-intentioned,
its effect was to deny one party the right to arbitrate a dispute pursuant to
an express contractual agreement. This result has no statutory basis under
the securities laws or the Arbitration Act.
The second. alternative-the arbitration of all claims-is contrary to the
Wilko holding. Compelling arbitration of securities claims would coerce a
136. 543 F.2d at 543.
137. 1d. at 543-44.
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waiver of the right to litigate those claims in federal courts. Unless the se-
curities acts are amended to permit waivers of rights through predispute
arbitration agreements, or unless the courts are persuaded that arbitration
agreements are not waivers at all because agreements can be devised that
are fair and freely agreed to by informed customers, the second alternative is
not available.
The third alternative-bifurcation of the federal and pendent state law
claims-is the only viable alternative under the present securities and arbi-
tration acts. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, courts are empowered to
bifurcate an action presenting both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. 138
Courts also have discretion to stay either the trial or the arbitration until the
happening of some occurrence or the resolution of the other pro-
ceedings. 139 Accordingly, if the arbitrable claims predominate over the
securities claims, courts have stayed trial on the securities claims until arbi-
tration of the pendent claims is concluded. 140 Conversely, where the
securities claims predominate over arbitrable issues, courts have stayed ar-
bitration until the securities issues were tried and resolved. 141 Not surpris-
ingly, this power to stay either proceeding is most effective where the ar-
bitrable and nonarbitrable claims are factually and legally distinct because in
such a case a second proceeding would not necessarily duplicate the prior
hearing. 142 Presumably, a court can effectively use this discretionary power
when the first proceeding would resolve the entire dispute between the par-
ties. The court in Sibley contemplated this result when it arranged the vari-
138. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). See Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d at 544; Collins Radio Co. v.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 1972); Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 453
F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Tepper Reality Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., 259 F. Supp. 688,
692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
139. In the cases cited in note 138 supra, trial was stayed pending arbitration. For cases in
which arbitration of state claims was stayed pending resolution of federal securities claims, see
note 141 infra.
140. See cases cited in note 138 supra.
141. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 832 (7th Cir.
1977); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (2nd Cir. 1970); Frier
Indus., Inc. v. Glickman, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,845, at
96,850; Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. at 220. See also Todd v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 78 F.R.D. 415, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (where federal securities law claims involve factual
questions that are essential elements of common law claims, arbitration before litigation is inap-
propriate). Accord, Peacock v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,201, at 96,587 (N.D. I11. 1979).
142. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d at 1030-31; Sam Reisfeld & Son Import
Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d at 681; DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. at 57. In Mansbach,
plaintiff investor alleged federal securities and state law claims arising out of identical facts.
Having noted that allowing both arbitration and litigation would be clearly duplicative and pos-
sibly effective of inconsistent results, the Sixth Circuit instructed the district court that if it
should find, on remand, that the requisite legal elements of the claims are substantially similar,
it should determine both the state and federal claims. If the claims were not found to be legally
similar, the district court was instructed to resolve the federal claims and stay arbitration of the
state claims pending such resolution. 598 F.2d at 1030-31.
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ous claims in a logical sequence and concluded that the resolution of one
claim would render the remaining claims moot. 143
Despite its feasibility, bifurcation is not a satisfactory alternative. At best,
invoking the discretionary power to stay a trial or arbitration undercuts the
certainty that is normally desirable in securities cases. As this Article has
shown, a decision to stay is apparently hit or miss, applied almost totally on
an ad hoc basis. In addition, because the factual and legal basis of the arbi-
trable and nonarbitrable claims are identical in most securities Lases, 144 the
second forum would inevitably retrace the same evidentiary and legal ques-
tions already presented to the first forum. This duplication of time and effort
is not only costly but vulnerable to the possibility of inconsistent results.
Furthermore, although the Sibley court's hope that the first forum's resolu-
tion would end the entire dispute may have been reasonable in that case, 145
it is too tenuous an expectation to be the basis for any sound federal pol-
icy. 146 Certainly, an integrated federal policy regarding securities and ar-
bitration rights should not be based on such a bald presumption.
Bifurcation also contradicts the very strong federal policy of pendent juris-
diction, which rests on the desire to have parties resolve their entire con-
troversy in one proceeding. 147 Severance of factually and legally similar
143. See notes 136-137 and accompanying text supra.
144. See Klaus v. Hi-Sheer Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1975) (false and misleading
statements in proxy solicitations made by directors constituted a violation of federal securities
acts and breach of management's fiduciary duty to stockholders under California law); Hidell v.
International Diversified Inv., 520 F.2d 529, 536-37 & n.16. (7th Cir. 1975) (action against
corporation alleging violations of both state and federal securities laws derived from common
nucleus of facts so as to assert pendent jurisdiction even though federal claim was ultimately
dismissed); Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (federal and state securities claims derived from same opera-
tive facts so that pendent jurisdiction existed even though federal claim was ultimately dis-
missed because of the running of the statute of limitations); Ferland v. Orange Groves of
Florida, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 703, 709 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (federal claim for sale of unregis-
tered securities and state claim for fraud and deceit based on same factual situation). See notes
102-116, 127-137 and accompanying text supra. But see Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 387
F. Supp. 355, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (where proof of plaintiff's state claim would involve facts
relating to corporation's listing agreement with stock exchange but where such facts were not
common to plaintiff's federal claims, state and federal claims did not derive from common nuc-
leus of facts and court was without pendent jurisdiction); notes 115-118 and accompanying text
supra.
145. See text accompanying note 137 supra.
146. For example, in Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal.
1974), the rule 10b-5 claim based on the broker's alleged misrepresentation of the investor's
financial status to another broker would certainly not have been settled by the arbitrator's deci-
sion on the breach of contract claim. See notes 102-116 and accompanying text supra.
147. Federal courts have the power to assume pendent jurisdiction whenever there is a sub-
stantial federal claim and the relationship between it and the asserted state claim permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises one constitutional case. See gener-
ally UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not expand federal jurisdiction, FED. R. Civ. P. 82, to the extent that they require plaintiffs
to try their entire case at one time, they embody policies aligned with the theory underlying
pendent jurisdiction. 383 U.S. at 725 n.13. Although pendent jurisdiction is a matter of judicial
discretion, id. at 726; Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
19801
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claims will almost inevitably result in duplication of time and effort and
prejudice to the parties who are forced to litigate their controversy in a
piecemeal fashion. 148 Inherent danger also awaits a party compelled to try
his or her case a second time, after a portion of the case has been decided in
another forum. Bifurcation and pendent jurisdiction, therefore, simply are
not compatible legal theories.
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The present use of predispute arbitration agreements in the securities in-
dustry is neither evenhanded nor uniform in wording or application. Many
provisions do not provide full and fair disclosure to the investor regarding
the possible meanings and ramifications of the arbitration provisions.
The SEC has articulated three major areas of concern surrounding arbitra-
tion agreements. 149 First, because arbitrators are affiliated with the self-
regulatory exchanges, 150 investors hesitate to use arbitration facilities be-
cause they believe that the procedure will be impartial. 151 Second, the
arbitration procedure is too complex for the typical investor to handle on his
or her own without counsel. Finally, the arbitration fees can become pro-
hibitively expensive. 152 Moreover, predispute arbitration clauses are, in
1034 (1975), as long as the claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts, courts will
normally exercise jurisdiction over the pendent claims. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545
(1974); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725; Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1971). The test for determining pendent jurisdiction is essentially
whether substantially the same evidence will prove both federal and nonfederal claims. See
Vanderboom v. Sextan, 422 F.2d 1233, 1241 (8th Cir. 1970); Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy
Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968).
A disposition exists to retain state claims under federal jurisdiction, derived from a deference
shown to federal laws in certain areas, a desire to have parties litigate their entire controversy at
once, and a supposition that the pendent state law claim is somewhat inferior. Beginning with
Gibbs, several policy arguments have been offered in support of a permissive doctrine of pen-
dent jurisdiction. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court grounded the justification for pendent jurisdic-
tion upon considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. 383
U.S. at 726. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 545. Indeed, the Court in Gibbs stated that ifa
case does not present these three concerns, "a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdic-
tion over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them." 383 U.S. at 726, citing
Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
148. Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. I11. 1972).
149. See Exchange Act Release No. 13470, Inplementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution
System, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,906.
150. See Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 889, 135
Cal. Rptr. 26 (1976).
151. See Exchange Act Release No. 13470, Implementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution
System, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,906. See also
Smith, Breaking the Chains that Bind: Arbitration Agreements Versus Forum Rights Under the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 749 (1979).
152. See Exchange Act Release No. 13470, Implementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution
System, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,906.
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many cases, a compulsory prerequisite for doing business in the market. 153
For these reasons, predispute arbitration agreements must be re-
examined. 154
In an attempt to address these concerns, the Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration has been engaged since 1977 in developing and imple-.
menting uniform, fair and efficient arbitration procedures for investor-broker
disputes. 155 Any proposals made by this group should at least satisfy the
following conditions promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) 156 for the enforceability of predispute arbitration agree-
ments under the Commodity Exchange Act:15 7
1. That signing the agreement not be made a condition of access to
the market;
2. That the customer sign separately the clause providing for arbi-
tration; and
3. That there be a warning in bold face type that the customer is
giving up certain rights to assert his claim in court. 158
153. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Oral Hearing on Arbitration and other Dis-
pute Settlement Procedures (March 5, 1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 27,526 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 42,944-
45 (1976). The conclusion of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is particularly rele-
vant to this Article because to an increasing extent the public investor is diversifying both as to
portfolio and as to the nature of financial instruments in which funds are committed.
154. In a recent release, Securities Exchange Comm'n Release No. 34-15984, SEC Warning
to Broker-Dealers Concerning Arbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements, BNA No.510, at
J-1 (1979), the SEC warned broker-dealers that the continued use of predispute arbitration
clauses without releasing adequate information to investors is both inequitable and possibly
violative of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Id. The Commission noted
that recent cases complied with Wilko's protection of the investor's right to a judicial forum, but
that inadequate and unexplained arbitration clauses were still prevalent in customer agree-
ments. Id. at J-2.
155. Exchange Act Release No. 13470, Implementation of an Investor Dispute Resolution
System, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC, L. REP. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,905. The Office
of Consumer Affairs established by the Commission recommended a program for resolution of
disputes between individual investors and broker-dealers. The cogent points of the program
were:
1. Institution of in-house customer complaint processing systems by brokerage
firms.
2. Drafting of a uniform code of arbitration.
3. Establishment of a network of "small claims adjustors" to settle customer
claims under $1,000.
Id. at 87,906-07. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration has developed a simplified
arbitration procedure for resolving customer claims of $2,500 or less and a Uniform Code of
Arbitration. See Third Report of the Securities Industrj Conference on Arbitration to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (January 31, 1980).
156. See 17 C.F.R. § 180 (1979).
157. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 7a(11), 12a (Supp. 1979). The Act was
recently amended, Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 11, 92 Stat. 870 (1978), to authorize, but not require,
the contract market to delegate its responsibilities to a registered futures association having
standardized rules and arbitration procedures. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7(a)(11) (Supp. 1979). This
would allow for a more centralized arbitration program for customer claims in lieu of, the differ-
ent systems currently maintained by various contract markets.
158. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b) (1979).
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The satisfaction of these conditions renders predispute arbitration agree-
ments under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act enforce-
able. 159 It must be noted, however, that the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act expressly addresses the arbitration of customer disputes 1
60
by requiring that each contract market "provide a fair and equitable proce-
dure through arbitration or otherwise" for the settlement of customers'
claims up to $15,000, 161 and that "the use of such procedures by a customer
shall be voluntary. 162 The federal securities acts, however, do not specifi-
cally mention arbitration of customers' disputes, and thus an amendment of
the securities acts may be necessary in order to provide the SEC with the
option to develop regulations similar to those promulgated by the CFTC.
The implementation in securities disputes of the conditions required by a
Commodities Commission agreement would go a long way toward closing
the gap currently left open in the securities area.
Most important in formulating acceptable arbitration procedures is the re-
tention of the public's confidence in the securities markets generally and in
dispute resolution specifically. This confidence can only be earned by main-
taining both a de facto as well as a de jure image of fairness in arbitration
procedures. 163 One certain barrier to public confidence in arbitration is the
"basic unfairness in requiring the nonmembers [the public investor] to sub-
mit [disputes] to arbitrators, all of whom have been appointed [or selected]
by the Exchange," of which brokerage firms are members. 164
Both individual investors and exchange members have vital rights and in-
terests regarding the question of who shall exercise direct authority and con-
trol over the sponsorship and conduct of arbitral forums and proceedings. It
logically follows that all sectors must have an equal representation and voice
in the formulation of arbitration rules and proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Investors in securities require the ready availability of a forum in which
disputes can be resolved in a speedy and impartial manner. Delay can be
159. See Protzko v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980 Current Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,800, at 23,258 (1979) (predispute arbitration agreement that does not comply
with the requirements of § 180.3 of Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulations may
not be used as basis for arbitration proceeding and complainant is not prejudiced with regard to
reparations); Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.
1977), reversing 76 Civ. 3085 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 1977) (condition of regulation must be met
in all predispute arbitration agreements, not only those specifically mentioned in the Act).
160. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(11) (Supp. 1979). See Milani v. Conti Commodity Serv., Inc., 462
F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (interpretation of § 7a(11)).
161. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(11) (Supp. 1979).
162. Id.
163. Statement of Constantine N. Katsoris before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Dec. 8, 1977).
164. Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 26, 28 (1976).
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tantamount to a denial of due process and unnecessary exposure to market
risk. Arbitration represents the only remedy that provides a meaningful di-
mension of due process without the prohibitive costs, delay, and protractions
of litigation. When weighed against the potential dilution and waiver of cer-
tain substantive legal rights, arbitration should be found to be an acceptable
manner of resolving securities disputes. Accordingly, once clear, unambigu-
ous and fair arbitration provisions are formulated, Wilko v. Swan must be
overruled.

